

Wang Huning, “The Structure of China’s Changing Political Culture”

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Introduction by Matthew D. Johnson

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Wang Huning (b. 1955) is widely viewed as China’s most powerful intellectual. He has directly served the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee under three successive leaders: Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. He is currently the fifth-ranked member of the Party’s seven-man Politburo Standing Committee and directs the Central Secretariat, effectively making him Xi Jinping’s deputy in managing day-to-day Party affairs.

Although Wang’s role is succinctly described outside of China as that of an “ideologue,” in reality he also serves on a range of central Party commissions that drive policymaking in areas such as political-legal affairs, cybersecurity, finance, Party-building, official appointments, and military-civil fusion. Given his depth of experience and proximity to Xi, it is possible that Wang will rise even higher within the Party hierarchy when the 20th Party Congress meets in October 2022.

Wang Huning’s influence within the Party is attributable to his insights into how to secure socialism against the forces of Western globalization. Early on in his academic career at Fudan University, Wang diagnosed weaknesses in China’s system as the chief threat to socialism’s continued survival. These included the lack of a more inclusive “political technology” of Party-state organization suited to China’s national conditions; the lack of a unified political culture; and vulnerability to Western cultural hegemony imported through foreign trade and other forms of soft international power.

Wang produced much of his most important writing between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s – a period when China’s political economy and foreign relations were all being transformed by deeper integration with the world economy. Within this process of “reform and opening,” no country loomed larger than the United States, which Wang visited in 1988.

His record of that journey, *America Against America* (Shanghai Arts Press, 1991), was published in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre and political crackdown of 1989, both praised and criticized American society, and established Wang's reputation as a trenchant analyst of democracies. Notably, Wang's impression of the U.S. was of a country in crisis, which he attributed to irreconcilable tensions between forces of unity and individualism. Writing at the height of economic competition between the U.S. and Japan, he seemed to predict that Japan's "collectivism" (集体主义) provided a model for it and other countries to challenge the global position of the U.S. for decades to come.

Variations on the twin themes of global counter-hegemonism and domestic statism appear in every major Party theory from the Mao Zedong era to the present. Nonetheless, Wang Huning's intellectually rigorous appraisals offered a persuasive framework for reconstructing post-Mao politics because they directly contradicted the inevitability of liberal democracy, using examples drawn directly from the post-Cold War economic successes of countries other than the United States. In other words, they credibly and convincingly told China's leaders what they wanted to hear.

As one of China's leading "neo-authoritarian" establishment intellectuals during the late 1980s, Wang constructed a China-specific version of modernization theory inspired by American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, which he used as a lens for diagnosing internal Party organizational issues such as corruption, center-local institutional relations, and the preservation of political order amidst economic development.[2]

The sweep of his expertise, coupled with an interpretive arc that bent toward legitimization of highly centralized socialism as a political system, attracted the attention of Party leaders Wu Bangguo 吴邦国 (b. 1941) and Jiang Zemin, who are credited with having ordered his transfer to the Party's internal policy think tank – the Central Policy Research Office (CPRO). Wang became the CPRO's director in 2002, a position he held until relinquishing it to his protégé Jiang Jinqian 江金权 (b. 1959) in 2020. During this time he joined the Party Secretariat in 2002; the Politburo in 2007; and Politburo Standing Committee in 2017.

Proximity to the halls of power in Zhongnanhai have made the post-1990s evolution of Wang Huning's thinking more difficult to reconstruct. A likely hypothesis is that his Huntington-esque structural-functionalism has become indistinguishable from the dominant ideology of the Party itself. Wang is widely credited with having contributed to the major theories of each of the Party leaders he has served: Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents," Hu Jintao's "New Development Concept," and Xi Jinping's "China Dream of the Great Revival of the Chinese Nation and "Xi

Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

He was also, at least during its early phase, identified as an influence on the Belt and Road Initiative.[3] The common denominator of all of these theories – and, as noted by numerous observers, behind much of Wang’s work[4] – is the shared vision of a China in which the Party rules indefinitely, and of a world in which China is a more influential power.

This means that Wang has also become widely equated with China’s more combative strategic turn under Xi – a view that is undeniably credible given Wang’s history of rejection of Western globalization and all that it portends for China’s future if left unchecked. Yet a key piece of his thinking that is downplayed in profiles of Wang as a hardline, if ideologically tinged, power politician is his view of culture – expressed as “tradition,” “values,” or “civilization” – as an independent factor in determining political outcomes.

As an intellectual, Wang is therefore one in a long line of thinkers who have identified modernization as a process in permanent tension with the shared belief systems that bind human communities together. Viewed from the perspective of political order, modernization is desirable only insofar it can be counterbalanced with the creation of new value systems whose functional role is to keep institutions strong and societies governable. Strong states are culturally unified states. For an establishment intellectual in the context of CCP-ruled China, this means preserving and centralizing Party authority; renovating and expanding faith in Party socialism; and recalibrating globalization to make the international system more conducive to Party survival.

Wang is an “ideologue” in the sense that his views emphasize the importance of homogenizing values to conform to the Party Center’s strategic interests regardless of domain – in other words, his role as an official is not confined solely to propaganda or ideological education. At the same time, it is clearly no accident that Wang’s rise through the political ranks has coincided with an increasingly urgent emphasis on political belief and unity of purpose within the Party (e.g. the “Remember the Mission” campaign and political rectification of the Party’s internal security apparatus); orchestrated veneration of Xi Jinping and Xi Jinping Thought; and the enforced cultural cleansing carried out among religious communities and along China’s ethnic frontiers.

For all of these reasons, Wang’s role in China’s history may end up being that of another would-be “engineer of the soul,”[5] who for both political and nationalistic reasons envisions the salvation of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as attainable only through the unceasing transformation of those who live within and beneath it.

The text translated here, “The Structure of China’s Changing Political Culture,” is among Wang Huning’s most cited articles and, at the time of its publication, contributed to a broader intellectual movement within late 1980s China aimed at challenging the Marxist model of socialism.[6] Wang’s argument is simple: it is a society’s cultural factors (rather than its economic organization) that create its politics. Changes in what Wang calls social “software” – values, feelings, psychology, and attitudes – can therefore shape a society’s political future. However, Wang’s argument also operates on another level: as an assertion that China’s political culture, and therefore political path, is different than that of the West. Examining China, Wang finds society in the midst of transforming from a “culturally oriented political culture” driven by political mobilization to an “institutionally oriented political economy” driven by economic mobilization. Essentially, he is describing the shift from Maoism to Dengism, which replaced emphasis on class struggle with political stability and improved material standards of living.

In its basic conception Wang’s analysis draws from the field of communication theory as it emerged in the U.S. during the mid 1960s. This branch of social science emphasized the impact of traditional political culture and other aspects of individual psychology on nation-building and the creation of “modern political life” in emerging societies.[7] Like the American political scientists writing decades before him, Wang finds a persistent and undesirable tension between past values and what is needed to create a more modern future. His examples are both historical and contemporary, addressing what he calls China’s “history-society-culture nexus.” Historically, he claims, China has already passed through three phases in the development of its political culture: traditional, modern, and Marxist-socialist. Because none of these have resulted in the elimination of structures preceding them, China’s political culture remains in an “unformed state” – still modernizing, but without a “proper identity.”

Wang is also unreserved in his criticisms of contemporary Chinese society at the local level, and particularly in rural areas. Drawing from a 1987 survey of political attitudes, he describes the traditional structures of village life as basically unchanged:

Everything Fei Xiaotong [1910 – 2005] found in his study of village China—the so-called “differential mode of association”, the “lineage,” the “distinctions between men and women,” the “ritual order,” and “blood ties” continue to exist, if not at the same level as in the past. The introduction of the responsibility system has begun to change this stagnant pool in recent years, as openness and the commodity economy have had their effect, which is sometimes manifested as a deformed combination of old and new elements. We might even say that in many distant rural cultures, modern political consciousness and political concepts have not yet arrived, and modern political language remains couched in the language of the rural culture of family and

kinship, in contrast to urban political culture. Most of Chinese rural political culture has not experienced real development for a considerable time, and is only now beginning to change. In addition, other regional structures are also in the process of transformation.

Viewed from this perspective, the situation for post-revolutionary society is dire. However, Wang has a solution: to rapidly “re-engineer” and renew China’s political culture by purifying the traditional, modern, and Marxist-socialist structures that still remain, and build a unified “synchronic” political culture on top of these. As China’s population becomes more widely exposed to the process of political socialization, he implies, a new value system will begin to more fully emerge.

But what kind of value system? Wang’s article answers this question in a way that may surprise readers more familiar with his reputation as a leading neo-authoritarian thinker and – now as a leading member of the CCP’s Politburo – political and ideological centralizer.[8] The key appears in this brief description of the purpose of China’s political development:

The renewal of political culture is the fundamental basis for the construction of democratic politics in China and an important condition for the socialist system to demonstrate its superiority.

Elsewhere, Wang expands further on the need for “the components of the modern structure that embody the spirit of modern democracy and humanism” to “take root and grow.” Though he cites (approvingly) American democracy theorist Robert Dahl, it is ambiguous what kind of democracy Wang is referring to – less ambiguous, however, is his specific recommendation that:

In the specific context of China's reform and opening, China's political culture needs to add elements in the areas of participation, democracy, consultation, equality, rights, responsibility, competition, and the rule of law.

China will not inevitably pass through a Western-style bourgeois revolution. However, its Marxist-socialist revolution has, he argues, largely failed in replacing core values passed down from ancient times.

In 1988, the future envisioned by Wang Huning was wide open. China’s political culture was a

blank – or only partially filled – slate. One year later this sense of political optimism would be considerably more muted, if not foreclosed, as the political features of Dengism began to emerge and harden. This harder authoritarian turn was in part a response to the movement for expanded political participation that Wang's article seems to support. Some of its other recommendations, by contrast, survived: reaffirmation of top-down ideological engineering as a basic feature of the socialist Party-state; overriding of local and regional particularism in Chinese society with universalizing "core values"; taking modernization and development of the "commodity economy" as the precondition of cultural renewal. The last point in particular is in tension with Wang's apparent willingness to embrace political culture as its own independent force in creating social transformation. But viewed from the perspective of hindsight, it appears to foreshadow the deferral of democratization in favor economic growth, and national strength, that has defined China's politics throughout Wang's political career.

Favorite Quotes

"We can thus argue that the role of political culture cannot be underestimated, either in examining the current development of China's society and politics, or in analyzing their historical evolution. In the modern era, Chinese politics has embarked on the long path of transition from a culturally oriented political culture to an institutionally oriented political culture, and the main track of China's political development has yet to move beyond this historical process. It is accurate to say that the changes of the last few years have been the fastest-paced in this long process, and the political culture of Chinese society today is in a state of transformation. In terms of social development, Chinese society is moving from a society that is politically mobilized to a society that is economically mobilized, from an economy of production to an economy of consumption."

"To emphasize the diachronic structures is to emphasize that they are in a state of transformation. A profound change is currently occurring in China's political culture. The traditional, conservative, closed, centralized, subjective, and arbitrary aspects of Chinese political culture are being transformed into new, open, decentralized, objective, and democratic aspects. This transformation is both a continuation of a historical transformation and the manifestation of a new transformation. Contemporary Chinese political culture has far-reaching historical dynamics. It is a continuation of the transformation of Chinese political culture since the beginning of modern times, a transcendence and rejection of the classical, modern and recent synchronic structures."

"Which political culture is better adapted to Chinese society depends on factors such as social characteristics, national identity, psychological characteristics, and political conditions. The structure of Chinese political culture prior to the latest transformation included some negative or

non-modern elements. The persistence of 'leftist' ideology, the lingering remnants of feudalism, and the mixture of old and new factors have produced certain results, such as a weak grasp of ideas of democracy and the rule of law, a diffuse sense of political responsibility, a hazy sense of political participation, a weak sense of rights, and a deformed sense of power. The purpose of the development of political culture is to overcome these elements and incorporate the positive, democratic, and innovative ones. The problem can be boiled down to creating a social culture that can create new behaviors and changing the psychological preconditions that govern behavior patterns. The renewal of political culture is the fundamental basis for the construction of democratic politics in China and an important condition for the socialist system to demonstrate its superiority."

"The bourgeois revolution in the West promoted the basic values of freedom, equality, fraternity, and democracy, and on this basis a political culture evolved over the succeeding centuries. The ancient Chinese core values emphasizing the respective roles and duties of ruler, subject, father, and son similarly dominated the political culture at that time. But there are no core values in China's most recent structure. This lack has multiple meanings: it may mean that the value itself has yet to evolve; it may mean that the value exists but has not universally entered political culture; and it may mean that we do not have vehicles to carry out the transmission of values. Since 1949, we have criticized the core values of the classical and modern structures, but have not paid enough attention to shaping our own core values. In and of itself, Marxism transcended the Western rule-based worldview, but in China, which never possessed that worldview, the results of the adoption of Marxism were not always positive. Therefore, to forge core values today means grasping the overall process of transformation from a culturally oriented political culture to an institutionally oriented political culture, and to choose core values conducive to this transformation."

Translation by David Ownby

The process of global integration has prompted contemporary political science to become increasingly aware of the political importance of cultural differences between societies and peoples. Overcoming natural obstacles, breaking down artificial barriers, and eliminating parochialism have been the stepping stones for the introduction of cultural factors into the work of political scientists. Ruth Benedict's (1887-1948) 1946 study of Japanese culture, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, can be seen as the beginning of this process. Human societies inevitably structure life so as to favor certain ways of coping with events and certain ways of measuring them, and people living in particular societies see their ways of solving problems as their basis for viewing the entire world.

More than ever before, people today have come to understand that political life is not solely

determined by “hardware” factors such as institutions, systems, power, and norms, because there is also “software” involved, in other words, underlying or internal forces, such as values, feelings, psychology, attitudes, etc. The analysis of political culture has grown precisely out of people’s responses to this new understanding. Chinese politics is currently changing. In this situation, it is necessary to examine the history of Chinese culture and its components, its synchronic and diachronic structures, its current state and what it is becoming.

One

Chinese political culture has traditionally been “culturally oriented,” which is different from Western political culture, which is “institutionally oriented.” Culturally oriented refers to a political culture that is itself inextricably linked to family life, social life, moral life, and ethical life, so that political culture is diffused throughout the larger social culture. Society acts on political life through certain cultural mechanisms and the general subjectivity shaped by these cultural forms, so that the realization of political life is in fact the unfolding of social and ethical life.

An institutionally oriented political culture makes a clearer division between the political sphere from the other spheres just mentioned, recognizing that subjects may take on different identities in different spheres, and establishing the unique procedures, mechanisms, functions, and structures of political life. In modern times, the traditional structure of Chinese political culture has encountered many attacks and has experienced many ups and downs, due both to the penetration of foreign cultures and to the accompanying changes of internal cultures, but it is difficult to say that the basic subjectivity of the traditional political culture has been fundamentally transformed.

The idea of a culturally oriented political culture is still an indispensable dimension for understanding Chinese political life, and something that should not be overlooked when we contemplate reforms of the political system. Neither the culturally oriented political culture nor the institutionally oriented political culture is the result of people’s personal choices, but rather the result of the interaction of a certain level of social development, a certain social structure, and a certain subjectivity. As Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975) put it, the norms, customs, and habits of human society are interrelated, forming a network of norms that governs all spheres of human life, even if these components perhaps have no internal logical relationship.

However, psychological connections exist even if logical connections do not. Social evolution is

often very slow, and while the surface can sometimes change completely in a few years or decades, the deeper layers of social relations evolve less rapidly. Therefore, a closer look at the situation of Chinese society requires examining this society's historical, social, and cultural conditions, and the links among these conditions.

We can thus argue that the role of political culture cannot be underestimated, either in examining the current development of China's society and politics, or in analyzing their historical evolution. In the modern era, Chinese politics has embarked on the long path of transition from a culturally oriented political culture to an institutionally oriented political culture, and the main track of China's political development has yet to move beyond this historical process. It is accurate to say that the changes of the last few years have been the fastest-paced in this long process, and the political culture of Chinese society today is in a state of transformation. In terms of social development, Chinese society is moving from a society that is politically mobilized to a society that is economically mobilized, from an economy of production to an economy of consumption.

Political life is only one structure, or system, within social life, and when the larger system changes, politics can change in two possible directions: first, it can change as the history-society-culture nexus changes, thus adapting to and advancing social change; second, it can transcend the existing limits of economic and social change and leap ahead of time, becoming the conceptual and psychological force itself that directs social and economic change. In either case, the support of a certain political culture is indispensable.

Political culture is subtle, yet powerful. If we compare the political life of a society to an iceberg in a vast ocean, the vast part below the surface is the political culture of a society. According to the sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt (1923-2010), it is crucial to integrate political processes with the broader context of social civilization; civilization shapes the political process, which develops and matures in civilization. In China's particular cultural context, the effectiveness of political culture is particularly remarkable. This is partly due to the highly developed state of political culture, and partly due to society's identification with political culture.

According to a 1987 analysis of 7.4 million data points drawn from 3,204 surveys administered by the Chinese Citizens' Political Psychology Research Group, Chinese citizens demonstrate a high level of political sensitivity. Among the respondents, 83.51% believe that it is important to be concerned about major national affairs, 77.67% say that they are "very concerned" or "relatively concerned" about the overall stability and occasional fluctuations of the political situation, 57.01% possess a certain number of political beliefs, 49.13% think they should fight for their political beliefs at all costs, and 56.99% of citizens say they are willing to talk about political

issues.

These figures do not reveal the specific structure and content of citizens' political culture, but they do show the role that political culture can play. As a result of long-term cultural conditioning, Chinese society has a high level of political sensitivity. This sensitivity has been strengthened to an unprecedented degree by the development of modern politics, which in turn constitutes a condition for the existence of a culturally oriented political culture.

In his analysis of the concept of "political people," the famous American political scientist Robert Dahl (1915-2014) distinguished among the apolitical class, the political class, the power-hungry, and the powerful, in order to analyze the different roles these groups play in political life. It does not seem appropriate to use Dahl's concept to classify people in a culturally oriented political culture, because he classifies them according to their attitudes and relations to the system. In China, most people belong to the cultural-political class, and this characteristic determines the fundamental role of political culture in Chinese political life.

The cultural-political class itself is a complex whole which resists generalization. But the cultural-political class is very different from the institutional-political class (or what Dahl called the "political class"), and its role is obviously different as well. The institutional-political class is defined mainly by its participation in the political process, that is, by their "actual participation in political life." In China's cultural climate, however, the effectiveness and power of political culture comes from the public's approval or disapproval, reaction or lack of reaction, or acceptance or lack of acceptance, instead of personal participation. It is easy to see that this is both a cultural and an institutional characteristic, a functional and a structural characteristic. This is only a preliminary attempt to suggest the importance of the transformation of a political culture, and it is worthwhile to push the reflection further.

Two

Political culture has a boundless, intangible existence that cannot be processed and molded like something with a more tangible form. Its formation and transformation always require a process. As an element of social culture, the development of political culture shares much with the development of social culture, and it goes without saying that the development of political culture is first of all a diachronic process.

Political culture is a broad concept, and different scholars have different definitions of it. Gabriel Almond (1911-2002) sees political culture as a set of political attitudes, beliefs, and feelings prevailing in a nation at a particular time, and this political culture is the product of the nation's history as well as current developments in the social, economic, and political realms. It is generally believed that political culture consists of political knowledge, political feelings, political values, and political ideals, which come together to constitute a whole, and which requires a historical process of processing, refining, solidifying, and integrating.

Therefore, to analyze the transformation of Chinese political culture, we must first consider the diachronic structure of political culture, which is the historical background required to understand contemporary political culture. Without this, we cannot grasp the kinship between contemporary political culture and traditional political culture, nor can we grasp the magnitude and historical motive force behind the transformation of contemporary political culture.

The following variables are indispensable for analyzing the diachronic structure of contemporary Chinese political culture :

First, the classical structure of political culture, or in other words, the basic content and spirit of political culture in traditional China. Traditional Chinese political culture emphasizes character, ethics, personal cultivation, goodness, and morality, so there is no distinction between church and state, and politics and scholarship overlap. Western political culture emphasizes society, law and institutions, power, and constraints on power, thus separating church and state, politics and scholarship.

The "collective unconscious" produced by Western political culture emphasizes external regulation, in other words, it regulates human actions through political systems, power relations, legal systems, and other mechanisms to achieve political goals or political ideals. The "collective unconscious" shaped by Chinese political culture instead emphasizes virtues such as benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness 仁义礼智信, loyalty, filial piety, brotherly love, forgiveness, and courage 忠孝悌恕勇, rites and sacrifices, such as those to the heaven, the earth, the ruler, ancestors, and teachers 天地君亲师,[9] and Neo-Confucian formulae like “aligning affairs, extending understanding, making intentions genuine, balancing the mind, refining one's person, aligning one's household, ordering the state, setting the world at peace 格物致知诚意正心修身齐家治国平天下,”[10] which emphasize the unity of heaven and man and the objective of becoming an “inner sage” and an “outer king 内圣外王.”

This consciousness led to the emergence of concepts such the one that emphasizes the distinction between the ruler and the common people. Because the spirit of classical political culture has not changed, its specific components resist change as well. Confucianism, grounded in human nature and aiming to bring peace to the world, diffuses political culture throughout the general culture, making the boundaries between them unclear, which had the double effect of stunting the development of political culture, but also of consolidating it.

Of course, the structure of a classical political culture is made up of a series of historical choices, and it cannot be simply imposed on today's society. The classical structure is only part of today's political culture, and it would be unfair to use it to explain the entirety of Chinese political culture. The specific elements of this classical structure are also evolving.

Second is the modern structure, i.e., the structure formed by the Hundred Days Reform movement of 1898 and the subsequent criticism of traditional culture. This structure began to emerge with the Opium War and reached its high point with the May Fourth/New Culture Movement. As Li Zehou (b. 1930) has rightly noted, the May Fourth Movement's rejection of tradition and embrace of Western culture marked a turning point in China's cultural history, already thousands of years old. In fact, the modern structure and the classical structure are at different epistemological poles.

The inner meaning of the modern structure is based in Western democratic culture, its ideas of natural rights, popular sovereignty, the social contract, and the separation of powers, as advocated by Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Penn, Jefferson, and others. These ideas run contrary to the spirit of China's classical structure, and there was a long and fierce battle between them.

It is clear that after nearly 150 years of back and forth, the existence of the modern structure is well established, and at least in terms of specific components, it has replaced the classical structure. We can see that the modern structure has its historical and geographical limitations, and, in terms of higher ideas, it also has more basic, philosophical limitations, which is related to its historical origins. Yet this structure was particularly attractive because it represented a realm that modern China had not reached.

Third, the most recent structure, that is, the political and cultural structure formed under the guidance of Marxism and socialism after 1949. It is more recent and more of its own changes and

transformations have been internally generated. Its evolution complemented China's New Democratic and socialist revolutions, and is also related to the characteristics of the "post-revolutionary society." In theory, the recent structure should have been able to transcend the classical and modern structures, but due to the specific conditions of Chinese society, this transcendence did not occur completely, so the recent structure remains intertwined with the other structures, forming a complex mixture.

The recent structure is dominated by Marxist political values and aims to transcend the second, "modern," structure, to say nothing of the classical structure. However, the socialist structure requires the existence of certain socio-economic conditions to achieve transcendence, which is what current policy-makers since 1949 have sought to produce. These conditions had yet to reach maturity in the socialist China that evolved out of a half-colonial/half-feudal state, and in which the socio-economic and human relations on which the old structures relied had not been completely transformed.

Thus, although the socialist structure achieved a guiding position, it did not completely eliminate the historical structures, which continued to offer occasional challenges, some of which were serious. The result of these confrontations was to greatly strengthen the third, most recent, structure, whose most extreme components took on extreme positions so as to eliminate the other structures. This process was inevitable and necessary at the time; without it, the new system might have become untenable.

However, the strengthening went to extremes under the influence of objective and subjective factors, and wound up destroying itself, resulting in the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was essentially a change in the recent structure. The components of the political culture shaped by the Cultural Revolution came to be divorced from the source that gave birth to this culture, as well as from social demands, social values, and social relations.

After the Cultural Revolution, other changes occurred, in which the structure that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution was thoroughly rejected, and the structure designed to replace it was, on the one hand, a restoration of the pre-Cultural Revolution structure, and on the other hand a recognition of and an adaptation to current needs of social, political, economic, and cultural development.

Thus, the recent structure is both "formed" and "unformed." It is "formed" because it has been developing for decades, and it is at the same time "unformed;" it is fighting against self-denial

and seeking its proper identity. The components of any political culture are constantly evolving, changing, and sublimating, and one cannot hope to form a political culture in the blink of an eye. However, the “negation of the negation” at the heart of the most recent structure does deserve attention, and it has had an important impact on the political life of society and the political consciousness of the public. It should not be forgotten that this recent structure is the main structure of Chinese political culture.

From a historical perspective, Chinese political culture has been constantly renewing itself and negating itself since the beginning of the modern era. Each diachronic structure implies the negation or criticism of the previous structure, and the result has been that no stable value system has evolved. Each new value system is eliminated before it takes root in the soil of social and political culture. The renewal of political culture is closely related to the formation of new value systems, especially to the socialization of new value systems.

It takes quite a long time for a new value system to penetrate a political culture so as to expel the old value system and support the new political culture. A value system is only really solid when it becomes what Pascal (1623-1662) called "second nature." There are not many countries in the world that have achieved this. In the developed countries of the West, a new value system evolved during the Renaissance, and it took about three hundred years to complete the process of socialization.

In the modern era, the value system attached to Chinese political culture has been undergoing a complete transformation for some fifty years, while the classical structure has silently carried forward at a latent level, even penetrating the two more recent structures, so that the value renewal pushed forward by social change and historical movements does not appeal to people. This is an important historical reference point in China's political and cultural transformation. Of course, part of the reason for this has to do with deeper philosophical issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.

Three

Political culture has not only an diachronic structure, but also a synchronic structure. In a sense, the role of the synchronic structure is even more crucial. The diachronic structure will ultimately join the synchronic structure and become a part of it. Naturally, in a cultural sense, each part of the synchronic structure has its own diachronic elements, and the accumulated diachronic structure will also manifest itself as the synchronic structure. We see this clearly in contemporary

Chinese political culture.

Therefore, when we talk about the changing structure of Chinese political culture, it is necessary to talk about its diachronic structure. The diachronic structure displays a combination of factors. Each factor is itself changing, and these changes in turn modify the relationship between the various components of political culture on the one hand, and hasten the transformation of social and political culture on the other.

To analyze a diachronic structure is quite complex. The diffuse nature of political culture makes it quite ambiguous. In addition, the broad scope of political culture makes it difficult to analyze its factor structure. China's changing political culture has an unusually complicated synchronic structure, and under the impetus of important changes underway in Chinese society, various factors are transforming in different ways.

Roughly speaking, the evolution of the diachronic structure has enabled us to identify three major elements—the survival of traditional political culture, the components of modern political culture, and the elements of recent political culture—all of which are currently interacting, competing, and complementing one other as the core of the current political culture. Of course this is merely a generalization. Differences between political cultures also include differences between generations, between men and women, between urban and rural areas, between classes, between groups, and between ethnic groups, to say nothing of divergences in terms of political knowledge, political feelings, political values, and political ideals, which of course includes people's preferences and judgements concerning political power, political institutions, political structures, political functions and political products, and so on.

To be fair, political culture is an elusive object, because it is too vast and boundless, which is indeed a major problem in the analysis of political culture. However, a theoretical design can be useful for analysis. Broadly speaking, the diachronic structure of political culture can be inserted into the following framework:

First is the factor structure, i.e., the various types of components making up the political culture. The factor structure itself is multi-layered and multi-directional. The factor structure can include traditional political concepts, modern political concepts, Marxist political concepts, and political concepts currently evolving in Chinese society, and the resulting psychology, emotions, and ideals can also be different components of the value system.

Second is the group structure, i.e., the sub-political culture of a group that has evolved specific boundaries due to certain conditions. This can be divided up by occupation, educational level, social status, race, language, age, etc. Table 1 [not reproduced] shows the influence of age differences on people's political perceptions. The group structure is a dynamic structure in political culture and is also the carrier structure 载体结构; and the factor structure is meaningful only if it is considered together its vehicle of transmission, which is equally true of the functional and geographical structures described below.

Third is the functional structure, that is, the sub-political cultures related to the various functions of the political system, such as perceptions, feelings and evaluations of the leadership function, administrative function, decision-making function, support function, development function, legislative function, regulatory function, etc. This part of sub-political culture tends to govern the choice and distribution of functions in the political system and, consequently, the style of political activities. Table 2 [not reproduced] illustrates the differences in this respect. We have encountered various difficulties in transforming government functions (changing direct management to indirect management, changing micro-management to macro-management, changing administrative intervention to legal regulation, etc.), among which is the dislocation of functional sub-political culture. Once the government function changes, if people's long-standing perceptions of government function do not adjust in time, this will become an obstacle. Of course, functional change itself will always promote the change of sub-political culture, but not so quickly.

Fourth is the geographical structure, i.e., the differences in political culture between ethnic regions, between urban and rural areas, between China's east coast and far west, and especially the analysis and transformation of rural political culture, due to different geographical locations and thus different levels of economic development and customs, all of which are striking. Eighty percent of China's population resides in rural areas, so most of the carriers of political culture are in rural areas. Because of a long period economic underdevelopment, the commodity economy has barely made a dent in the rural areas, and the traditional structure here is particularly strong and durable.

Everything Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005) found in his study of village China—what he called the "differential mode of association", the "lineage," the "distinctions between men and women," the "ritual order," and "blood ties" continue to exist, if not at the same level as in the past. The introduction of the responsibility system has begun to change this stagnant pool in recent years, as openness and the commodity economy have had their effect, which is sometimes manifested as a deformed combination of old and new elements. We might even say that in many distant

rural cultures, modern political consciousness and political concepts have not yet arrived, and modern political language remains couched in the language of the rural culture of family and kinship, in contrast to urban political culture. Most of Chinese rural political culture has not experienced real development for a considerable time, and is only now beginning to change. In addition, other regional structures are also in the process of transformation.

The above is only a preliminary analysis, and it is only one way of dividing things up. The political and cultural components and factors are so varied that any classification can only be a theoretical description, and not a true picture. These four diachronic structures are overlapping, acting on the system in an integrated way.

To emphasize the diachronic structures is to emphasize that they are in a state of transformation. A profound change is currently occurring in China's political culture. The traditional, conservative, closed, centralized, subjective, and arbitrary aspects of Chinese political culture are being transformed into new, open, decentralized, objective, and democratic aspects. This transformation is both a continuation of a historical transformation and the manifestation of a new transformation. Contemporary Chinese political culture has far-reaching historical dynamics. It is a continuation of the transformation of Chinese political culture since the beginning of modern times, a transcendence and rejection of the classical, modern and recent synchronic structures.

This transformation has profound social, economic, and cultural effects. It first originated in the transformation of post-revolutionary society itself. I once suggested that the general trends in the present stage of development of post-revolutionary society are: 1. A general reform of the ideological line, 2. Modernization as the main socialist project, 3. The market mechanism as an auxiliary to the planned economy, 4. The institutionalization of political life, and its understanding in terms of law, 5. The gradual reform of traditional institutions, giving rise to new ones, 6. Multiple connections with the outside world, 7. The full affirmation of the concept of democracy and democratic rights, 8. The comprehensive development and application of modern science and technology, 9. The comprehensive development of culture and art education, 10. The active renewal of the dynamic and creative spirit of all members of society.

The totality of current social change will inevitably affect the transformation of political culture. Today, the motive force behind the transformation of Chinese political culture is reform and opening. Reform and opening are giving birth to new political and cultural elements, which will in turn nourish reform and opening. It is just as Marx said: "The mode of production of material life conditions the whole process of social, political and spiritual life." However, the growth of new political and cultural elements is generally slow, and until they replace the old ones, the

existing political and cultural elements often play a restraining or inhibiting role rather than a facilitating one.

The transformation of contemporary political culture is driven not only by the economy and society, but is itself also in a synchronic structure with society and culture. In the last decade, Chinese society and culture have been undergoing a rapid transformation, which, in summary, has displayed the following ten characteristics: 1. The evolution from a culture of revolution to a culture of construction, 2. The evolution from a politically oriented culture to an economically oriented culture, 3. The evolution from a collectivist culture to an individualistic culture, 4. The evolution from a unidimensional culture to a plural culture, 5. The evolution from a spiritually oriented culture to a materially oriented culture, 6. The evolution from a culture in which proof is based on principles to a culture in which proof is based on function,[11] 7. The evolution from a goal-oriented culture to a process-oriented culture, 8. The evolution from a culture defined through ideals to a culture defined by reality. 9. The evolution from a single-source culture to a multi-source culture. 10. The evolution from a derivative culture to an innovative culture.

All of these are highly abstract formulations, each of which possesses a rich and varied content that cannot be discussed here. The transformation of Chinese political culture is also characterized by the above-mentioned features. Socio-cultural transformations act on the diachronic structures of political culture, but the different structures of political culture are not under equal pressure, and transform at different rates and degrees. The variability in the speed and magnitude of the transformation of various sub-political cultures is an important feature of China's changing political culture.

Four

The overall evolution of Chinese political culture since modern times has been basically a process of transition from a culturally oriented political culture to an institutionally oriented political culture. This process has been constantly interrupted by political, social and cultural changes, and thus has proceeded in fits and starts. The transition has been particularly pronounced since the twentieth century. There are various reasons explaining this transition, among which the "modeling" effect of the economic, technological, scientific, and cultural aspects of Western society is the most important.

What is clear is that the transition to a institutionally oriented political culture is not yet complete, but remains in a gradual process of change. In many cases, the institutionally oriented

political culture is merely an aspiration or an ideal, and the actual process is much more elusive. The culturally oriented political culture is rooted in the deep and fertile soil of Chinese history, society, and culture, and cannot be easily changed; it will only change as social reality evolves, and such changes often do not occur simultaneously.

Accompanying this process, the structure of local political culture has repeatedly and forcefully manifested itself. Over the course of the modern era, and continuing today, the main structure of Chinese political culture has encountered several radical shifts. The negation of the classical structure by the modern structure first threatened the traditional value system, and a new value system began to be grafted onto the political culture, and out of its evolution emerged the dual value system of the culturally oriented political culture and the institutionally oriented political culture. An even greater shift occurred after the establishment of the socialist system.

The modern structure was essentially based on the value system of Western modern democracy, which was already quite distant from the human and social order of traditional Chinese society and therefore did not take firm root. The recent structure is the antithesis of the value system on which the modern structure is based, and the logical result is the negation of the modern structure. Consequently, Chinese political culture has a triple value system, and the value system of the most recent structure rejects the other two.

For various reasons, the recent structural development lost its balance and developed in extreme directions, deviating from the Marxist value system and creating an atmosphere encouraging extreme left thinking and practice at a deep psychological level. This biased value system was gradually imposed through political authority and coercion, and had a pivotal influence on Chinese society. Therefore, leftist thought and even the ten-year disaster are explained not only by institutional factors, but also, and more importantly, by a cultural atmosphere that was adapted to foster it. This should be a most enlightening historical lesson.

After 1949, the modern transition from a culturally oriented political culture to an institutionally oriented political culture slowed. In addition to the subjective rejection of the value system based on Western democracy and its inappropriateness for the socialist system, there were deeper reasons. Understood in full, Western democracy is derived from the worldview grounded in law, which regards the state and formal law as the determining forces in society, all of which has to do with how democracy evolved out of feudalism.

Marxism differs from this law-based worldview in that it is a sociological or economic

worldview that focuses on civil society and the internal mechanisms and relations of this society, on the productive forces and the social forms expressed by the relations of production, and on the underlying political and economic relations. Politics and political culture are identified as secondary factors determined by these primary considerations. Marxism transcends the value system based on Western democracy and aims to transform society on a broader level, advancing human life through the transformation of social culture in the broad sense (including economic culture).

Here, skipping a step can produce a very different outcome: while the Chinese socialist revolution established the dominance of Marxism, China did not have the kind of value system that Marxism sought to transcend. Unexpectedly, events brought an end to the institutionally oriented political culture, while the culturally oriented political culture was given an unexpected environment in which to grow, and eventually even intervened in the value system of Marxist political culture, manifesting itself in some peculiar combinations and alliances. Some parts of the classical structure broke free from the constraints of the modern structure and were reborn in disguised form in the space created by the turmoil.

Social order depends on culture when institutional factors are not developed; this is simply how things work, and was not the project of conscious design. On the one hand, this historical leap allowed people to skip the step of opposing feudalism and, on the other, to ignore historical conditions and pursue the value system of the future society. It was only after enduring this historical test and the tumult of the situation that people came to a clear understanding of what to do about building a political culture: the first priority was to determine our position based on the actual conditions of Chinese society, and here, the theory of the primary stage of socialism was a realistic positioning; the second was to eliminate the remnants of feudalism, as Deng Xiaoping said, and the task of eliminating these residual influences in the ideological and political realms should now be clearly affirmed.

In recent years, China's political culture has entered the moment of its most meaningful transformation. This transformation has been driven by political, economic, and cultural shifts in Chinese society. Existing economic, political, and cultural institutions have been or are currently facing comprehensive reform. Culture shapes institutions, and institutions can shape culture. The cultural climate that has been shaped by more than 30 years of highly centralized institutions will inevitably be transformed in this reform. The reform of the political system has more directly influenced the transformation of political culture, which has been facilitated by the emancipation of ideas, the establishment of democratic institutions, the definition of democratic political goals, the development of education, the opening up of culture, and the construction of many individual institutions. This change is no less significant than the previous ones. But it has just begun, and

the outcome will depend on concrete processes.

The redefinition of the principles of life in Chinese society on the basis of the theory of the primary stage of socialism implies a re-examination of the guiding principles of the past. From the point of view of political culture, it is also a kind of re-engineering. This is the transformation of political culture. This transformation will be more comprehensive, profound, and thorough, for two reasons: first, it is a rejection of the extreme "left" political culture value system that marked the period prior to 1978; second, it is a reexamination of our entire recent political culture.

Under the conditions of the transformation of the existing system, especially the political system, the transformation of the political culture is inevitable, and in a sense, it resumes the evolution of the institutionally oriented political culture. The current reform of China's system is aimed at changing and improving the system, as opposed to the previous path of political development, which was based on ideological transformation. Of course, the question of which one is more suitable for Chinese society is a matter for discussion and practical examination.

Chinese political culture is in the midst of a transformation, and past elements are either disappearing or should disappear, while new elements are being created. The early stage of such a transformation is marked by certain characteristics, the most fundamental of which is that the value system, which is the core of political culture, is undergoing a process of renewal, rejecting the old and ushering in the new. The overall characteristics of China's changing political culture are:

1. High political sensitivity. This has been nurtured over a long period of time. According to a public opinion survey, 94.22% of respondents agreed that "the rise and fall of the country is everyone's responsibility," 54.14% of respondents were proud of living in a socialist country, 74.95% and 85.65%, respectively, disagreed with the statements "if your country lets you down, you are right not to love it," and "if your country lets you down, you are right to betray it," which illustrates the high level of patriotism in Chinese political culture.

2. Low political identity. Although political awareness is high, identification with the political system and the political value system is low, because both are in a state of flux. This is evidenced in Tables 3 and 4 [not reproduced], where 72% of the respondents say that the political system should be reformed, and 66% say the same in Table 4. Table 5 [not reproduced] shows that citizens do not particularly identify with political leaders either. There is a paradox here: on the one hand, citizens have developed a high level of political sensitivity over time, and on the other

hand, they find little with which to identify. This paradox might explain a certain number of phenomena, as well as some political and psychological restlessness and behavioral agitation. This is also inevitable in times of transition. The key is to fully understand this situation in order to promote the transformation of political culture.

3. A lack of political knowledge. Political knowledge refers to the understanding of political power, the political system, political norms, and political functions, etc. Since political culture itself is always changing, and this will ultimately yield a more rigorous and scientific level of political knowledge, it may be understandable that current political understanding is poor. Another reason is that previous political knowledge is no longer applicable. Yet another is the low level of political socialization, as Table 6 [not reproduced] illustrates, with 75.15% being aware of the constitution, but only 1.6% having a clear understanding of it. The situation is no different in all other respects. This situation is obviously not conducive to the development of political culture and politics in general.

4. Political sentiment is weak, i.e., the citizens' sense of belonging to and attachment to the political system or political authority is weak. As a result of the period of political turmoil and the subsequent reform of the political system, people are generally critical, which is a natural phenomenon in the period of changing political culture. Another sample survey shows that 74.4% of respondents believe that without political democracy, even if the economy improves, China will not be fully modern, and 81% of respondents say that the time is ripe for the reform China's political system. This is understandable at a time when old systems are giving way to new. Society's feelings about a system depend on how it works and how effective it is in practice.

These four characteristics are a product of the general environment of reform in China, and we see both positive and negative tendencies. The positive tendencies are those that contribute to the development of new patterns of political behavior, and the negative are those do not contribute to political stability and the effective functioning of the political system. Under the present conditions, we should fully understand the positive and negative effects of this political and cultural structure, and take effective measures to eliminate the negative while preserving the positive.

This is the inevitable state of affairs in the process of transformation, and not a problem with China's changing political culture. China's changing political culture is giving rise to unprecedented new elements, which to a certain extent promotes the spirit of democracy, creativity, equality, and competition in China's political culture. This will have a profound impact on the development of China's political culture and practical political relations.

Five

To say that political culture is in the process of transformation is to say that political culture is in the process of development. Based on the elements examined in our analysis to this point, we can proceed to analyze the question of the development of Chinese political culture. The development of political culture necessarily involves both the synchronic and diachronic structures of political culture, as well as its functional and structural features. In real life, these structures are inseparable, and the transformation is comprehensive.

To sum up the historical changes, the development of Chinese political culture is still tending to follow the path from a culturally oriented political culture to an institutionally oriented political culture, which is necessary and inevitable. The most recent changes have made this even clearer. However, this is merely the direction of the current stage, and objectively speaking, the culturally oriented political culture and the institutionally oriented political culture both have their own characteristics.

Which political culture is better adapted to Chinese society depends on factors such as social characteristics, national identity, psychological characteristics, and political conditions. The structure of Chinese political culture prior to the latest transformation included some negative or non-modern elements. The persistence of "leftist" ideology, the lingering remnants of feudalism, and the mixture of old and new factors have produced certain results, such as a weak grasp of ideas of democracy and the rule of law, a diffuse sense of political responsibility, a hazy sense of political participation, a weak sense of rights, and a deformed sense of power.

The purpose of the development of political culture is to overcome these elements and incorporate the positive, democratic, and innovative ones. The problem can be boiled down to creating a social culture that can create new behaviors and changing the psychological preconditions that govern behavior patterns. The renewal of political culture is the fundamental basis for the construction of democratic politics in China and an important condition for the socialist system to demonstrate its superiority.

Political culture can be divided into cognitive, affective, evaluative, and attitudinal dimensions, but these dimensions are not equal. The key to the nature of a political culture is the value system that supports its basic structure. The source of the value system can be further traced through philosophical analysis. Chinese political culture has been in the process of constant change since

the beginning of the modern era, because new values have replaced old values too quickly, without allowing these new values to be digested.

As Tu Wei-ming (b. 1940) has noted, China's modern history has known many ruptures, with important changes or setbacks occurring every five or ten years, and each rupture has had its complex impact on the mindset of traditional culture, leading the modern Chinese people to lack a sense of unity, clarity, and continuity in history. The transformation of Chinese political culture at the present time cannot be said to have established a definitive value system, which explains the emergence of the phenomena I analyzed in section Four. Neither the traditional value system nor the modern value system has taken root, nor has the traditional value system withered away.

The persistence of tradition is explained by the fact that people have not found an effective way to get rid of it, nor have material conditions sped the process, and the new values simply have not yet found the soil in which to flourish. The most recent value system is also in process of self-renewal and has not yet reached a relatively stable state. Contemporary Chinese political culture basically revolves around the most recent value system, and once it takes shape, the transformation of the entire political culture is assured. But if the new value system is not constructed quickly, the political culture will lose its core momentum and disperse in various directions, thus producing various negative results.

Thus the most urgent task in the transformation of Chinese political culture is to form a new value system. We of course cannot conjure this value system out of thin air; on the one hand, it must accord with objective political, economic and cultural developments, and on the other, it must promote a higher-level cultural and spiritual atmosphere that will contribute to the objective development process. Only when the new value system is established and fully socialized will the situation we have been discussing finally change. To construct a value system, China's changing political culture must do three things.

First, we must reflect seriously on the synchronic structure of China's political culture, examine the positive and negative elements of the value systems of the classical structure, the modern structure, and the most recent structure, separating the wheat from the chaff, the true from the false, so that the components of the classical structure that represent the spirit of Chinese culture and the characteristics of the Chinese nation can be carried forward and developed. We must combine the flexibility of these traditional values with the modern spirit, so that the components of the modern structure that embody the spirit of modern democracy and humanism can find the support they need to take root and grow, and identify the elements of the recent structure that are consistent with the pursuit of the broad ideals of mankind, so that they truly guide the creation of the new value system. This is the only way to bring the three structures together in an organic

way, thus finally leaving behind the long period of mutual discomfort and exclusion, bringing together what is native and foreign, traditional and modern, realistic and ideal.

Second, we must carry out a positive transformation of the synchronic structure. No matter what kind of synchronic structure we are dealing with, or the way we classify the structure, new elements must be added. These new elements can come from two sources: they can emerge naturally from the developments in current society, or they can be actively promoted by people. In the specific context of China's reform and opening, China's political culture needs to add elements in the areas of participation, democracy, consultation, equality, rights, responsibility, competition, and the rule of law. With the change of economic and political culture, these components will grow and consolidate.

Third, we must create core values. The transformation of a political culture is a long process, which needs to grow and develop based on a certain value system. The primary task that Chinese political culture must take up at the present moment is the creation of core values, that is, the core concepts that make up the value system. Otherwise, the development of political culture will be, as John Dewey (1859-1952) said, "determined by habits, prejudices, class interests, and traditions embodied in institutions." For a relatively long time, some of the problems of Chinese political culture have been related to the instability of core values. Core values are not something unattainable, but instead consist of a few universal if deeply rooted concepts.

The bourgeois revolution in the West promoted the basic values of freedom, equality, fraternity, and democracy, and on this basis a political culture evolved over the succeeding centuries. The ancient Chinese core values emphasizing the respective roles and duties of ruler, subject, father, and son similarly dominated the political culture at that time. But there are no core values in China's most recent structure. This lack has multiple meanings: it may mean that the value itself has yet to evolve; it may mean that the value exists but has not universally entered political culture; and it may mean that we do not have vehicles to carry out the transmission of values. Since 1949, we have criticized the core values of the classical and modern structures, but have not paid enough attention to shaping our own core values. In and of itself, Marxism transcended the Western rule-based worldview, but in China, which never possessed that worldview, the results of the adoption of Marxism were not always positive. Therefore, to forge core values today means grasping the overall process of transformation from a culturally oriented political culture to an institutionally oriented political culture, and to choose core values conducive to this transformation.

Political culture cannot transform or develop on its own, but instead requires a material base. The development of Chinese political culture ultimately depends on the socio-economic and

political direction of Chinese society. Chinese political culture has always been a culturally oriented political culture, which essentially reflects the social structure and human relations of Chinese society. According to Liang Shuming (1893-1988), the fundamental principles of Chinese politics were linked to ethics and morality, becoming an indissoluble whole; Zhang Dainian (1909-2004) said that Chinese philosophy combines knowledge and action, heaven and man in an order of true goodness; Wang Yanan (1901-1969) said that the Chinese family system, social customs, and educational thought became a "functional complement" to the political system.

All of these thinkers see Chinese politics as something that is inextricably intertwined with culture. Although Chinese political culture has changed dramatically since ancient times, it cannot be said to have changed completely. This traditional mechanism still exists today and continues to play an important role. As modernization advances, this situation will undergo unprecedented, exciting changes. We can be sure that with the modernization and the development of the commodity economy, changing Chinese political culture will gain an ever broader basis for renewal.

Notes

[1]王沪宁, "转变中的中国政治文化结构," 复旦学报(社会科学版), 1988.3: 55-64.

[2] An excellent overview of neo-authoritarian views and their context is Jude Blanchette, "Wang Huning's Neo-Authoritarian Dream," October 20, 2017.

[3] Jane Perlez, "Behind the Scenes, Communist Strategist Presses China's Rise," The New York Times, November 13, 2017.

[4] See for example:

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323728204578513422637924256>;
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-president-inner-circle-western-officials.html>; <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116964/wang-huning-low-profile-liberal-dream-weaver-whos-about>; <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/09/handling-of-us-trade-dispute-causes-rift-in-chinese-leadership-source.html>;
<https://www.chinalawblog.com/2019/06/does-china-want-a-second-decoupling-the-chinese-texts-say-it-does.html>.

[5] See John Garnaut, “Engineers of the Soul: Ideology in Xi Jinping’s China,” Sinocism, January 16, 2019.

[6] See Yan Sun, *The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976-1992* (Princeton University Press, 1995).

[7] See e.g. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton University Press, 1965).

[8] “As others argued that China could never modernize without becoming democratic — a view that later gave rise to the ill-fated student movement based in Tiananmen Square — Mr. Wang made the case in a 1988 article that an enlightened autocracy would be “highly effective in distributing social resources” in order to “promote rapid economic growth.” Jane Perlez, “Behind the Scenes, Communist Strategist Presses China’s Rise”, *The New York Times*, November 13, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-wang-huning.html>, cf Yufan Huang, “Xi Jinping Adviser Has Long Pushed for Powerful Leadership”, *The New York Times*, September 29, 2015, <https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/china-president-xi-jinping-advisor-wan-huning/>

[9] Translator's note: These characters were often found on votive plaques in temples and other places of worship, reminders of the essential relationships to be revered.

[10] Translator's note: Translation taken from Robert T. Eno, *The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean: An Online Teaching Translation*, p. 9.

[11] Translator's note: My impression is that Wang's reference here is to something like the more familiar “practice is the sole criterion of truth,” but it is phrased a bit awkwardly.